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REVIEW ESSAY
The Cuban Missile Crisis
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The events of 11 September 2001 have had such a tremendous impact on
the world at the beginning of the twenty-first century that the Cold War now
seems rather unimportant. Yet, in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet
Union almost went to war over Soviet nuclear missiles clandestinely transported
to Cuba. The world stood on the brink of a massive thermo-nuclear exchange
between the superpowers and the final determination not to wage war manifest-
ed itself in the personal decisions of President John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader
Nikita Krushchev. For years numerous books on the Cuban Missile Crisis saw
print bereft of archival research in the Soviet Union or the unknown tape record-
ings that President Kennedy made of the crisis management team he assembled
to deal with the missiles in Cuba.  Kennedy’s team was known as the Executive
Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm). Since the fall of the
Berlin Wall, however, scholars have been probing Soviet archives and the infor-
mation available on the ExComm tapes has received wider attention. The two
books under discussion utilize these new sources and help Crisis scholarship leap
forward.
The first work under consideration is “One Hell of a Gamble”: Krushchev,
Castro and Kennedy, 1958-1964: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis
by Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali.  Fursenko is a member of the
Russian Academy of Sciences and Naftali is an historian at Yale. As the book’s
title implies the missile crisis is examined within the larger context of the Cuban-
American antagonism dating from 1958. They contend that the missile crisis
produced neither heroes nor villains, “just human beings, who are flawed, some-
times dangerously so, and whose dramatic risk-taking created equally dramatic
history.” (p. xi)  Using newly accessible Russian sources the authors build a new
profile of President Kennedy’s leadership and contend that, allowing for the pos-
sibility of bias, “Soviet archives constitute a remarkable repository of every
American initiative, probe, or gaff associated with the superpower relationship.”
(p. x) 
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Specifically, the new Soviet archival sources have led Fursenko and Naftali
to sharpen the image of Kennedy’s personal foreign policy initiatives with the
Soviets in the 1960s, executed primarily between his brother Robert and Georgi
N. Bolshakov, a Soviet military intelligence officer. Kennedy’s back-channel
diplomacy ultimately failed as the Soviets played a deadly game of chess in the
backyard of the United States. The authors contend that Krushchev was in a state
of disbelief when he finally realized that Kennedy was taking active measures to
meet the Soviet threat. There is good information regarding the Soviet military’s
perception of possible American responses. An airborne assault was envisioned
as far more likely than an amphibious assault and Krushchev even identified the
possibility of a full naval blockade. Unfortunately, the focus on Soviet archival
sources led the authors to perhaps under-utilize the tape recordings President
Kennedy secretly made of the ExComm meetings beginning on 16 October. They
identify the changing nature of opinions within ExComm and the fact that
Kennedy was conditioned by an adherence to international morality, but their
analysis of ExComm, covering only 18 pages, is not as comprehensive as that
provided by the author of the next book under consideration.
Sheldon M. Stern’s work, Averting ‘The Final Failure’: John F. Kennedy
and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings is much more focused on the
events of October 1962. As the head historian at the John F. Kennedy Presidential
Library from 1977 to 1999 Stern was in an unequalled position to conduct an
intensive re-evaluation of Kennedy’s ExComm tape recordings. They represent
the principal primary American source for the decisions reached at the time.
Stern argues that the ExComm tapes “provide an incomparable chance to scruti-
nize history exactly as it unfolded” and to “document the substance and quality
of JFK’s leadership.” (p. xiv) However, Averting ‘The Final Failure’ is not a
complete presentation of the actual transcribed recordings. To the contrary Stern
chose to present his evidence in narrative form. He offers that “I was definitely
the first professional historian to review these tapes” (p. xvii) and that is proba-
bly why he feels confident enough to select such a methodology.
Stern demonstrates little sympathy for the previous crisis scholarship
because “virtually none” of it “has systematically included or investigated the
incomparable evidence found on these tapes.” (p. xv)  He criticizes the two pre-
vious published transcriptions, Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow’s The
Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis (1997)
and their subsequent edition based upon work at the Presidential Recording
Project at the University of Virginia’s Miller Center of Public Affairs as “seri-
ously inaccurate.” (p. 428)  Stern even includes examples of the differences in
transcription between the Miller Center’s edition and his own in segments at the
end of the book devoted to unclear transcription, missing words, phrases, sen-
tences, and speakers, and mistranscritptions which alter the historical record.
Indeed, this last segment is the most intriguing. To cite one specific example, the
Miller Center edition transcribed Kennedy’s words in once instance as: “If we go
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into Cuba we have to all realize that we are taking a chance that these missiles,
which are ready to fire, won’t be fired. So that’s a gamble we should take.” Stern
agreed with this passage except for the last sentence, which he transcribes as: “So
that’s . . . is that really a gamble we should take?” (p. 436)  In fact, Stern’s tran-
scription of this exchange between Kennedy and the Congress directly contra-
dicts Fursenko and Naftali’s transcription which frames the President’s words in
the form of a statement of policy, not a question as to whether it should be so. (p.
ix)
Both books serve their purpose. “One Hell of a Gamble” is principally
underpinned by Soviet sources while Averting ‘The Final Failure’ is a virtual
case-study of the Kennedy tapes. Anyone seeking to expand their understanding
of the missile crisis would do well to entertain the arguments contained in both
books. Soviet archival research will only continue to redefine certain aspects of
the crisis from the Soviet perspective. Conversely, it now stands to reason that
Stern’s work must be taken into account if one is to undertake any serious inves-
tigation of decision-making on the American side. Indeed, simply as a corrective
to Robert Kennedy’s own crisis memoir, Thirteen Days, Stern’s work is indis-
pensable. Both books are highly recommended. 
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